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No. 5779.

In Bank.

Feb.

v. ANTHONY Cl'l'RINO,

Criminal Law- Appeal- Objections- Evidence.- Where a
criminal case was tried before the
Court's decision
defendant
44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d
from raising on appeal the question that
obtained evidence was admitted against him though
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the
trial.
Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where the record is
silent as to whether officers
premises and defendant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no evidence
illegality of the search, it must be presumed
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.)
Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where
could have testified to the presence of a conditional
it from the house that was
sales contract without
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by
admission of the contract in evidence.
See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and
§ 6 et seq.
McK.
References:
§ 1079; [2] Searches
and
§ 1 [3]
Law, § 1382;
Criminal Law,
§ 393(2);
Burglary, §§ 25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Witnesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal
Law,§ 589; [12] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9).

Witnesses-Cross-examination-Scope.~\Vhere

examination denies any
the prosecution can
him with the burglaries, and it is
cross-examination how his automobile
whether he had been in the

was

Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Crossto defendant's

§ 38;

§ 74.
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!d.-Conduct of Counsel.·-Where defendant had testified that
he left a certain place because the police were looking for him,
it was not improper for the district attorney to make the observation that defendant was ''carefully avoiding that address,"
this
a reasonable inference from defendant's testimony.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of
Prosecuting Attorney.-1n a prosecution for burglary, the
district
statement in his argument to the jury,
"Here you have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the
latter part of his years to a life of crime," though improper
because not supported by evidence, did not constitute reversible error where the jury was immediately instructed to
disregard it and in the light of the whole record it did not
11ffect the verdict.

APPE.A.IJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Eustace Cullinan, Jr.,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second degree burglary, affirmed.
Anthony Citrino, in pro. per., and Robert E. Tarbox, under
appointment by the District Court of Appeal prior to transfer
of the appeal, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant . A.ttorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYKOR, J.-Defrendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of
two counts of second degree burglary.
During the eyening of June 3, 1954, or the early morning
of J nne 4th, the premises of ·william and Frederick Motors
in San Francisco were burglarized. An automobile, various
items of garage equipment, a battery, and tools were taken.
During the evening of J nne 5, J 954, or the early morning
of June 6th, the premises of Pacific Nash :Motor Sales were
burglarized. An automobile and a safe containing the company's records and automobile ownership certificates were
taken. A few days later defendant sold to Ralph Astengo,
a service station operator, some of the tools and equipment
belonging to William and Frederick Motors and their employees. The sale price of $25 was much below the market
yalue of the items sold. Defendant told Astengo that the
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and equipment \Yen~ his and that ''
them from
his father . . . . '' Astengo requested and receiwd a bill of
from defendant, who signed it >Yith the name ''Anthony
'' He returned in about fiye minutes and changed the
to ''Anthony Cotelli.'' At the trial, however, detestified that an acquaintance named Gino Cotelli
gave him the tools and equipment and that he did not know
where Cotelli was. ·when arrested he was asked if he had
sold property under the alias of Cotelli and he refused to
a!lswer He admitted that he had lived at 345 Second A venue
in San Francisco under the name of Anthony Colla. He
tnc:t1r1Pr1 that he shared this house ·with Bill Bragg and Gino
and that the three of them moved out of the house
on .rune 17th because an informant told him that Inspector
Keating of the San Francisco Police Department was looking
for him and Bragg. Before defendant's arrest, Inspector
Keating and other officers searched the premises and defendant's automobile, which vvas parked nearby. 'l'hey found
property taken in both burglaries in the garage and on the
back porch and in the basement of the house. On a manteltogether with some of defendant's personal papers,
found a number of the stolen ownership certificates. On
9th, tools stolen from \Yilliam and Frederick Motors
were found in a liquor store in Oakland, following a burglary
thereof. An automobile purehasec1 by defendant under the
name of Robert Jennings was parked in a service station
adjacent to the liquor store. The motor and hood >Yere >Yarm.
Defendant testified that he g<we the car to Bragg on about
6th, that he did not commit the burglaries, that the
property found by the officers at 345 Second A venue was
there by Cotelli, and that he did not know how the
certificates got onto the mantelpiece.
[1] He contends that illegally obtained evidence was admitte(1 against him. Since this (•ase was tried before our
(1eeision in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].
he is not precluded from raising this question now although
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the
trial. (People Y. KitcllcJIS, ante, p. 260 f20-! P.2d 17].)
[2] The record, however, is silent as to whether the officers
l1ad a search warrant, and in the absence of any evidence
showil1g the illegality of the search, we must presume that
thr officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties.
(
Y. Farrar·a, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21]; Code Civ.
l'roc., § 1963(1), (15), (33); People v. Serrano, 123 Cal.App.

[46 C.2d

contract
and thus have shown
by
People

was
It is novv ' 'settled in this state
shows
criminal disposition, evidence
which tends
and by reasonable inference to establish
any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any
material fact
to be proved
the defense, is admissible
although it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge."
v. IV oods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509
P.2d
.)
Defendant's possession of the stolen
tools was a material fact, and the evidence that some of the
tools were found early in the morning in a store under
circumstances indicating that they had been recently abandoned
with the fact that defendant's recently driven
automobile was parked nearby was circumstantial evidence
that defendant had been in possession of the tools.
Defendant's main contention is that the evidence is insufficient to
the verdict. He argues that there is
in the record to connect him with the burglaries
other than the evidence of his sale of some of the stolen prop[6] Possession alone of property stolen
in
is not of itself sufficient to sustain the possessor's conviction of that burglary. rrhere must be corroborating
evidence of
conduct, or declarations of the accused
to show his
(People v. Boxer, 137 Cal. 562,
563-564
P.
People v. Oar1·oll, 79 Cal.App.2d 146,
148
P.2d 75].) [7] When possession is shown, howthe
evidence may be slight (People v.
124
402, 404 [12 P.2d 679] ; People v. Taylor,
217 [40 P.2d 870] ; People v. Russell, 34
669 [94 P.2d 400] ; People v. Thompson,
120 Cal.App.2d 359, 363 [260 P.2d 1019] ), and the failure
to show that possession was honestly obtained is itself a
CUlUH"'"'
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P.2d 500] .) Other corroborative evidence >vas his false
to Astengo that he received the
from
his father (see People v. Oonracl, 125
185
P.2d 31] ; People v. Goodall, 104
247
P.2d 119]; People v. iVlercer, 103 Ca1.App.2cl
789
P.2d 4] ; People v. Buratti, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 417.
, his
v. Russell, supra, 34 Cal.App.2d 665,
tools and equipment worth more than $150 for $25
v. Bttratti, supra, at 419), his using the aliases
Colla'' and ''Anthony Cotelli'' in making the sale
v. Buratti, S1ipra, at 419; People v.
supra,
Cal.App. 402, 404), and his testimony that he and the
moved out of the house on Second Avenue because an
informant told him that Inspector Keating was looking for
him and that he bought the automobile found in Oakland
the name of Robert Jennings because the inspector
looking for him under the name of Anthony Colla.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erronepermitted the district attorney to question him beyond
the proper limits of cross-examination. (Pen. Code, § 1323.)
On direct examination defendant denied any participation
two burglaries charged. On cross-examination he was
how his automobile got to Oakland and whether he had
in the vicinity at the time it was found. The questions
proper, for when a defendant takes the stand and makes
denial of the crime with which he is
the
yyp,,~,on,nn+"'>' can show circumstances that tend to connect him
(Peoz?le v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 227-229 [223 P.2d
[10] Questions relating to defendant's use of false
azldresses in purchasing the automobile were improper, but
not have been prejudiced by them, since his use of a
name at the same time had already properly bPen shown.
Defendant contends tbat the district attorney was
of prejudicial misconduct in making an offer of proof
46 C.2d-10
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and in his argument to the jury. In attempting to determine
defendant's reason for flight when he heard that Inspector
Keating was looking for him, the district attorney asked defendant why he abandoned an automobile at the Second Avenue residence. Upon defendant's objection and the court's
observation that the examination was somewhat afield, the
district attorney stated, "'Well, your Honor, the car was
seen at Second A venue. The man was carefully avoiding that
address after the burglary.'' The observation that defendant
was "carefully avoiding that address" was a reasonable inference from defendant's own testimony that he left because
the police were looking for him, and even if the statement
that "the car was seen at Second Avenue" was "somewhat
afield,'' it would not justify a reversal. [12] The district attorney's statement in his argument to the jury, "Here yon
have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the latter part of
his years to a life of crime" was not supported by the evidence
and was therefore improper. The jury, however, was immediately instructed to disregard it, and in the light of the
whole record we do not believe that it affected their verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred. Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance but
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion with
respect to the rule announced in People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d
504 [218 P.2d 981], in which case I dissented. I do not
believe that the facts in the Woods case are analogous to
the facts in the case at bar or that it is necessary to rely
on the Woods case as authority for the conclusion reached
in the case at bar.

